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Beyond the Shareholder Corporation: Alternative Business Forms and the Contestation 
of Markets 
 
NINA BOEGER 
This article considers various, established and emerging, alternative business forms that differ 
categorically from the traditional corporation in terms of their governance, objectives and/or 
ownership structures, including mission-led businesses, social enterprises, cooperatives and co-owned 
firms. Notwithstanding their considerable diversity, the underpinning pattern of these alternatives 
points towards a stakeholder model of corporate governance that commits the firm to generating value 
by maximising the positive impact on its (internal and external) stakeholders while limiting negative 
impacts, with trade-offs to be carefully balanced against each other. Through these commitments, the 
firm internalises a process of democratic contestation: a procedure to mediate the different interests of 
these market actors is incorporated directly into the structure of the firm, through procedural 
mechanisms embedded within its internal constitution.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After a decade of economic turbulence following the 2008 global financial crisis, some commentators 
have begun seriously to question the foundations of international capitalism, and its ability to generate 
sustainable wealth and prosperity. Proposals of how we might develop alternatives to liberal capitalism 
or even a ‘post-capitalist’ order are being raised, not only in academia but also more widely within 
social movements around the world.1 Within these wider debates, much criticism is directed at the 
business corporation and its governance.2 The financial crisis has, among other things, highlighted the 
dominance of international corporate power and the shortcomings of existing corporate governance 
structures to adequately hold such power to account. Corporations with strong policies on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) would often argue they are committed to a wider social purpose. But these 
voluntary CSR commitments, which are usually linked to a business case for improving the company’s 
performance, do not fundamentally change the character of the corporation. Shareholders’ return on 
investment, short- or longer term, remains the measure against which the firm is assessed.3  
There are, on the other hand, various alternative forms of socially responsible firms that do not 
revolve mostly around shareholder value. Trading, and generating profit or surplus, is central to their 
activities (distinguishing them from charitable organisations), but so too is their commitment to a social 
or environmental mission and/or accountability to different groups of stakeholders and not just to 
shareholders. What makes these firms categorically different from corporations, even those with 
comprehensive CSR policies, is the fact that these commitments are not just fixed in voluntary CSR 
                                                          
1 P. Mason, PostCapitalism: A Guide to Our Future (2015). 
2 N. Boeger and C. Villiers (eds.) Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Toward Corporate Reform and Enterprise 
Diversity (forthcoming). 
3 P. Fleming and M.T. Jones, The End of Corporate Social Responsibility: Crisis and Critique (2013). 
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codes but are procedurally and structurally embedded into the firm’s constitution and its governance 
model.  
In recent years, more such forms are emerging, often incorporating principles drawn from 
cooperative and social enterprise models that precede the boom-and-bust years of the highly 
financialised capitalism of the 1980 and 1990s, into new organisational forms (see also the contributions 
by Prabhat and by Thorpe in this issue). New forms emerge in response to specific social, economic or 
environmental concerns, often but not always with a local dimension, and in different socio-economic 
conditions; a variety of initiatives, ranging from small-scale worker cooperatives in rural Greece,4 to 
employee-owned UK public health spin-outs that often set up as ‘community interest companies’,5 to 
multi-national ‘B Corps’ like the ice cream maker Ben & Jerry’s, that are certified for their social 
impact.6  
The concern in this article is not only to convey the diverse character of these alternative 
business forms, but also, more particularly, to highlight the common role that these formats share in 
capitalistically ordered economies; namely, to enable political contestation of markets, and their 
limitations. A conventional route for this to happen is through regulatory processes that impose external 
checks on corporations to ensure that their economic operation aligns with wider concerns in our 
societies (social and economic equality, fairness, solidarity, a flourishing environment, and so on). 
Through regulatory intervention, society asserts control over markets and market actors (firms), thus 
‘embedding’ (socialising) their operation by imposing (politically mediated) regulatory limitations on 
it.   
But the rise of alternative business forms points towards an alternative route where the firm 
itself, and its ‘transactional’ freedom to operate in the economy,7 is being instrumentalised as a means 
of enabling society to assert control over capitalistically ordered markets. Their operation, and their 
continuing growth and their diversity, suggests that the firm can be structured as an instrument for 
embedding alternative forms of organisation into markets, thus tempering their potentially destructive 
social and environmental effects, and the shortcomings of mainstream corporations. 
The discussion of these possibilities, and their challenges, is structured as follows. The first 
section conceives of our current ‘crisis’ of capitalism as a call for markets and their limitations to remain 
politically contested, to ensure that the socially destructive effects of ‘free’ markets are checked and 
tempered by regulatory intervention.  The second section examines the role of the corporation, and its 
corporate governance structure centred on shareholder primacy, in relation to this need for market 
contestation; highlighting that the current structure impedes the social embedding of markets, for a 
number of reasons. Section three positions this context against existing and emerging forms of 
alternative business organisations, including mission-led businesses, social enterprises, co-owned and 
cooperative firms (with an emerging trend towards multi-stakeholder variants of the latter). It engages 
(briefly) with the promises as well as deep complexities that emerge from these alternative business 
forms and their diversity. The final section on the other hand considers what it perceives as their 
underpinning pattern, namely, the outline of a stakeholder governance model of corporate governance 
that incorporates procedures for balancing various stakeholder interests in the firm, which is thus 
developed as an instrument for market contestation: rather than relying on external (regulatory) checks 
                                                          
4 I. Gidarakou, ‘Women’s Entrepreneurship in Rural Greece’ (2015) 10 International J. of Business and 
Management 129. 
5 K. Hall et al., ‘Public, Private or Neither? Analysing the Publicness of Health Care Social Enterprises’ (2015) 
Public Management Rev. 1. 
6 D. Hunter, ‘The arrival of B Corps in Britain: Another Milestone towards a More Nuanced Economy?’, in 
Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity, eds. N. Boeger and C. 
Villiers (forthcoming). 
7 B. Morgan and D. Kuch, ‘Radical Transactionalism: Legal Consciousness, Diverse Economies and the Sharing 
Economy’ (2015) 42 J. of Law and Society 556. 
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on the firm alone, these private economic choices incorporate internal democratic checks into the 
business’ very governance structure. 
THE POLITICAL CONTESTATION OF MARKETS 
 
One way to understand the current crisis of capitalism is through the writings of Karl Polanyi who 
considered the relationship between markets and society as a dialectic in which society checks the worst 
excesses of the market.8 For him, capitalism is sustainable only so long as the markets that enable it are 
embedded within human concerns. Their social embeddedness relies on a ‘double-movement’ between 
those who seek to liberate markets from regulation and those who wish to protect society from the 
harmful effects of unregulated markets. Importantly, it is the counter-movement – the call for regulation 
and social embeddedness – that in Polanyi’s view ensures a market economy remains sustainable. 
Without it, unregulated markets, and especially the destructive social effects of labour commodification, 
would harm and eventually destroy society and the environment.9 
Polanyi understood that the countervailing power of society, operating through counter-
movements and regulatory intervention as a check on markets, is traditionally channelled through, and 
shaped in and by, formal political (representative) processes. These processes allow confrontations to 
be mediated non-violently, and regulations to be formulated enabling members of society to dictate the 
limitations they consider necessary to impose on capitalism. In this way, market regulation itself 
becomes a dialectic exercise: a tug-of-war where the economic interests of market actors (businesses, 
consumers) are pitched against wider societal concerns (such as the protection of the environment, 
working conditions, public services, gender equality, and so on), and restrictions are imposed on the 
former to limit harm inflicted on the latter. Polanyi himself suggests that society usually manages to 
assert itself over the market, to protect human needs and social relations (including between citizens, 
workers, business partners, friends, relations). The question is whether we can ensure that markets are 
regulated (socially embedded) without the most severe backlashes; whether we can produce a capitalism 
that is able to check itself on a continual basis, tempering the socially and environmentally destructive 
effects of unregulated markets.  
The point is not that a specific level of social embeddedness, and blend of regulatory 
intervention, must be reached for markets to be sustainable. Rather, Polanyi’s framework points out the 
necessity of political contestation, as a reflection of plural interests, and differing views, of what is the 
‘social’ in society. The question of which human concerns society considers worthwhile regulating - 
and, conversely, to what extent it is prepared to give the market free reign – is open to vastly different 
interpretations. The call for contestation and counter-movements is a call for market regulation to be 
reflecting their diversity, mediated through political processes (see, similarly, the contributions by 
Prabhat, and by Parker and Haines, to this issue, expressing concern about who should be included in 
the regulatory process). His thinking therefore provides a useful starting point for explaining not only 
why capitalist markets must remain politically contested in order to be sustainable, but also why this 
contestation ought to remain socially inclusive. Social movements are diverse and, sometimes, in deep 
contestation with one another.10 Those with an interest in ‘freeing’ markets offer a particular blend or 
version of what is (should be) the ‘social’ in society, just as those seeking to impose (certain) limitations 
on markets will promulgate their own, potentially vastly different, version. Some movements organise 
around ‘grand narratives’ and ideologies, others narrow, even single-issue, and localised causes. 
Polanyi’s consideration of counter-movements implies a call for deep political contestation, to ensure 
                                                          
8 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (2002, first published 
1944). 
9 Polanyi, id., p. 80; F. Block and M.R. Somers, The Power of Market Fundamentalism: Karl Polanyi’s Critique 
(2014). 
10 R. Munck, Globalization and Contestation: The New Great Counter-Movement (2006), at chapter 2. 
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the channels of mediation between these different narratives and perspectives are kept open, with a view 
to socially embedding the market in society. 
THE CORPORATION: HOW ORGANISING AROUND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
IMPEDES MARKET CONTESTATION 
 
As key market actors, corporations are widely impacted by regulatory interventions in the market, but 
they are also capable of shaping these interventions and be part of social movements.11 Whether as 
addressees or indirectly as ‘shapers’ of regulation, corporations traditionally operate to serve the 
economic interests of those who provide their capital investment, namely, their shareholders or 
‘owners’. In legal terms, company directors are placed under an obligation to manage corporations for 
the benefits (as agents) of their shareholders, their primary objective being to maximise shareholder 
financial value, whether in the short or longer term. This is reflected in the corporate governance 
structure of the firm, including provisions on shareholders rights (amongst them, the right to appoint 
and dismiss the board), on directors’ duties and boardroom composition, the role of independent 
directors, and reporting and accounting.  
The primacy of shareholders, while widely absorbed into company law and corporate 
governance codes, continues to provoke deep controversy.12 For some, this model and its underpinning 
liberal economic theory marks the pinnacle of a long search for optimal efficiency in corporate 
governance. Others, however, criticise it for its inability to require more corporate responsibility and 
failure to prevent managerial risk taking and short termism in highly financialised capitalism. Without 
tracing these conversations in detail,13 the purpose of the following brief discussion is to consider the 
impact this particular corporate structure, and its institutional dominance in our economies, has on how 
society asserts control over markets and contests their limitations, by means of regulatory intervention.  
Shareholder primacy is a principle grounded in economic market logic: the corporation is 
structurally designed to prioritise the interests of capital on the basis that it renders it a more efficient 
market actor.14 The contestation of these interests however happens through external regulatory checks 
on the corporation (instructively, see Sjåfjell in this issue, discussing the role of the board of directors 
and proposals for reform). That is, directed regulatory interventions (for example, labour law, 
environmental regulation, fiscal requirements) impose an external limitation on the corporation, forcing 
its board, if necessary, to compromise the objective to generate shareholder value in order to 
accommodate certain wider concerns (of workers, the environment, local communities, and so forth). 
The intention is in this way to curb the most socially destructive effects that the capitalist interests of 
the corporation, if left unregulated, would produce (from labour exploitation to environmental 
degradation or consumerism). 
But these external checks on the corporation rely on the capacity of the formal political 
(representative) process to ensure that the regulatory ‘blend’ imposed on the corporation reflects 
democratically mediated ideas of the ‘social’ in society; and that these ideas are effectively imposed on 
corporations by means of external regulatory intervention. The trouble is that, crudely put, this 
conventional dialectic assumes that regulations impose external accountability on the firm, but says 
little about how the organisational structure of the corporation might impose itself on (or embed itself 
                                                          
11 S. Wilks, The Political Power of the Business Corporation (2013). 
12 L. Stout, ‘The Toxic Effects of Shareholder Primacy’ (2013) 161 University of Pennsylvania Law School 
2003; L. Talbot, ‘Trying to Change the World with Company Law? Some Problems’ (2016) 36(3) Legal Studies 
513. 
13 But see Boeger and Villiers, op. cit., n. 2. 
14 M. Jensen and W. Meckling ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure’ (1976) 3(4) J. of Financial Economics 305. 
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in) the political and democratic processes that shape these regulations. There are three specific concerns 
we might briefly consider here.  
The first is the issue of regulatory avoidance. Company directors will ensure that corporations 
comply with regulatory constraints to the extent that they consider it in the best interest of the firm and 
its shareholders not to incur sanctions or fines, or, in the longer term, not to sully the corporation’s 
reputation when this might impact on its future ability to make profits. But their primary response to 
regulation is usually to seek strategies that minimise the impact of the regulatory intervention on their 
business model, especially on their financial returns.15 Shareholder primacy means it is only natural for 
them to do this: it reinforces the antagonistic relationship between markets and society. In practice, this 
however turns regulation into a zero-sum game between business and politics. The further the 
corporation pulls one way, seeking to develop strategies to minimise regulatory impact on shareholder 
value, the more regulation has to pull back by adjusting its interventions. The effect of this, highly 
confrontational, play of ‘cat and mouse’ is that it renders regulatory intervention more resource-intense 
but potentially less predictable and effective.  
The second and related issue rests in the political influence of corporations, and their ability to 
shape regulatory interventions either directly (as active corporate lobbyists, or because political actors 
co-opt them into regulatory processes) or indirectly (as a result of how their economic choices, and 
especially the threat of relocation, impact on political actors).16 Lindblom for example has argued at 
length how governments’ ‘structural dependency’ on corporations as wealth-generating institutions 
means they will be, implicitly or explicitly, privileged in the political process. These privileges are not 
always made explicit but they are systemic, in an ‘unspoken deference of administrations, legislators 
and courts to the needs of business’.17 That is, beyond seeking out privileges actively (most obviously, 
through corporate lobbying), their accumulated capital and resulting economic power are systemic 
features in capitalistically ordered economies that enable corporations to gain privileged access to the 
political process. As a result, their interests have a better chance of finding accommodation in regulatory 
norms, serving only to increase their economic power and influence which in turn they may deploy to 
further shape regulations in their (economic) interest. But, compelled by their commitment towards 
shareholder value, company directors are bound to channel corporate influence in ways that serve the 
primary interests of their capital investors. The effect is like putting chicken in charge of their pen: 
regulation is shaped by capitalist interests in the corporation, when it is meant to temper them.  
The third issue, again related to the previous one, concerns what we may think of as the 
‘naturalisation’ of the conventional corporate form as a means of economic organising, and its effects. 
The corporation is, as we have seen above, not a politically neutral organisation. It incorporates certain, 
substantive and procedural, assumptions relating to its organisational structure, for example, that 
structural dependence on capital, and economic growth, generates wealth; that prioritising shareholder 
value leads to economic efficiency; that economic value is best measured by financial return; that 
competition augments productivity; hierarchy improves effectiveness; and so on (Parker, 
forthcoming).18 The issue here is that these should continue to be seen as organisation choices, and their 
implications as political, rather than it being accepted that the structure of the shareholder corporation 
has intrinsic advantages for economic organising, or in fact for organising more generally. Yet by 
implying there is an (economic) necessity to the logic of efficiency that underpins the shareholder 
primacy model, the (market liberal) economic underpinnings of that model do exactly the latter: by 
                                                          
15 Corporate Reform Collective, Fighting Corporate Abuse: Beyond Predatory Capitalism (2014). 
16 S. Wilks, The Political Power of the Business Corporation (2013); J. Ruggie, ‘Multinationals as Global 
Institution: Power, Authority and Relative Autonomy’ (2017) Regulation & Governance 1 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12154/abstract>. 
17 C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems (1977), at 178-9. 
18 M. Parker, ‘Epilogue: Necessity Organisation and Politics’ in Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards 
Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity, eds. N. Boeger and C. Villiers (forthcoming). 
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defining the issue as a matter of economic market logic they de-politicise (‘naturalise’) the corporate 
form.19 It becomes, as Parker puts it, a ‘vehicle for the normalization (or de-politicisation) of certain 
assumptions’ that characterise its organisation.20  
The implications of this are profound, not only in terms of what it means for the diversity of 
economic organisational forms. Political organising, and the political contestation of markets, relies on 
many different organisations – including businesses, but also associations, think tanks, clubs, 
communities, societies, parties, unions, charities, media outlets, public authorities, agencies, and others. 
These organisations are instruments into which social movements may embed themselves to pursue 
their interests, promulgate their worldviews and/or gain access to the political and regulatory processes 
that shape markets and their limits. Making sure that different patterns of organising are available and 
acceptable is therefore an intrinsic political concern for society, not least because it reflects our 
capability as humans to shape our organisations and, as Mayer points out, to ‘create concepts and 
institutions to assist rather than subjugate us’.21 
So, to summarise the argument thus far. Following Polanyi’s model, we may consider that to 
ensure their sustainability (and counter their potentially (self-)destructive effects), capitalistically 
ordered markets rely on societal intervention to ‘re-socialise’ their operation. Usually, this happens in 
the form of regulatory intervention, mediated through formal political processes. The structure of our 
conventional corporations – the focus on shareholder primacy – however, disturbs the equilibrium of 
(market) movement and (social) counter-movement because, broadly speaking, it means company 
directors will do whatever they can to protect returns on investment, and if necessary use the economic 
dominance and political power of their organisation to achieve this. This may involve minimising 
regulatory impact; influencing political processes in favour of their capital investors’ interests; or more 
generally, nurturing certain assumptions that, because it is the dominant form of economic organising, 
it is also the optimal form.  
From here, the argument proceeds in two steps. The first, set out in the following section, 
introduces the reader to some encouraging developments that suggest the search for alternative models 
of the firm has gained some traction, despite the continuing dominance of the stakeholder corporation. 
The second step, addressed in the final section of the article, provides an interpretation of these 
developments. It suggests that despite considerable complexity and diversity in their development and 
organisation, what connects their various features is an emergent alternative model of democratic 
contestation, where the firm itself is instrumentalised as an organisation to channel the socialisation of 
markets, and the contestation of their limits.  
BEYOND THE SHAREHOLDER CORPORATION: VARIANTS OF ALTERNATIVE 
BUSINESS 
 
Corporations run to optimise shareholder value prioritise one type of value (financial value) for the 
benefit of one set of stakeholders (the shareholders), if necessary at the expense of other stakeholders 
who might contribute to the business (employees), or might be otherwise impacted by it, either directly 
(consumers, suppliers, local communities) or indirectly (citizens in the welfare state, tax payers, the 
environment, and so on). Alternative approaches to organising the firm on the other hand might take 
the reverse premise as a starting point by extending the firm’s commitment to generate value towards a 
wider group of stakeholders, and taking fuller account of the impact of the business, positively and 
                                                          
19 Jensen and Meckling, op. cit., n. 14.  
20 Parker, op. cit., n. 20.  
21 C. Mayer, Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation Is Failing Us and How to Restore Trust in It (2013), at 
255.  
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negatively, on its stakeholders (a ‘pluralist’ approach).22 There are encouraging signs that, 
notwithstanding the continuing dominance of the shareholder corporation, more alternative business 
forms are emerging whose governance aligns more closely with such a wider approach. Often, their 
individual design depends on localised conditions including entrepreneurial and political culture as well 
as economic and regulatory context, but there are some broader trends shaping their current 
development, which the following analysis introduces briefly. 
1. Mission-led business 
 
One of those is a trend towards more mission-driven, or mission-led, corporate businesses. These firms 
continue to distribute their profits to their shareholders, but at the same time formulate a long-term 
commitment to have a positive social impact as a central purpose of their business, and regularly report 
on their social impact to their stakeholders.23 Their approach concentrates on finding room within the 
corporate structure to pursue a broader purpose or mission, for example by adjusting the constitutional 
object clauses and/or reporting requirements of the firm, in order to account for the overall impact of 
the business on its stakeholders, both internal to the firm and external. It focuses optimising the 
commercial flexibility of the firm while incorporating mechanisms that go beyond CSR to take account 
of those wider stakeholder interests. Importantly, these wider commitments are enshrined in the 
constitution of the firm – its articles of association and its governance model – rather than a CSR policy 
document.  
That does not make these mechanisms irreversible; corporate constitutions can be changed. 
Neither does it mean the company will always choose to forgo profits (or their distribution to 
shareholders) even when doing so might be required to protect certain stakeholder interests. Nor in fact 
does it guarantee that these wider interests can or will always be enforced or enforceable (see discussion 
further below). However, it does mean the business is structurally and procedurally committed, for a 
certain time, even for the foreseeable future, to pursuing a ‘blended’ purpose that prioritises a wider set 
of interests rather than just shareholder value.24  
In practical terms, there are various ways of structuring a mission-led business. In some 
jurisdictions, tailored corporate formats have been made available, including the benefit corporation or 
low-profit limited liability company in the US, with variable degrees of success.25 An alternative is for 
businesses to rely on the flexibility within the mainstream corporate legal format to accommodate 
stakeholder concerns in their constitutions, 26 without in fact having to resort to tailored forms. A third 
and related, and increasingly popular, option is for firms to become a certified ‘B Corp’. This involves 
an independent (private) certification process, including an assessment of the business’ governance and 
overall impact on internal and external stakeholders at least every two years. It also requires the 
inclusion in its constitutional documents of an objective to have a positive impact on society and the 
environment, and a declaration that sets out its commitment to its stakeholders and the environment.27  
                                                          
22 See J. Parkinson and G. Kelly, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist Approach’ (1998) 2 
Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Rev. 174. 
23 D. Hunter and N. Boeger, ‘What is the Point of Business?’ University of Bristol Law School Blog, December 
2016 <https://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2016/12/what-is-the-point-of-business/>. 
24 D. Brakman Reiser, ‘Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma’ (2010) 35 Vermont Law Rev. 105.  
25 Brakman Reiser, id.; D. Brakman Reiser and S. Dean, Social Enterprise Law: Trust, Public Benefit and 
Capital Markets (2017).  
26 B. Sjåfjell, ‘Dismantling the Legal Myth of Shareholder Primacy: The Corporation as a Sustainable Market 
Actor’ in Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity, eds. N. 
Boeger and C. Villiers (forthcoming). 
27 D. Hunter, ‘The Arrival of B Corps In Britain: Another Milestone towards a More Nuanced Economy?’ in in 
Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity, eds. N. Boeger and C. 
Villiers (forthcoming). 
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2. Social enterprise 
 
Some firms however choose to go further and commit their commercial operation primarily to a defined 
social mission, and to principally reinvesting their surplus revenue to advance their mission.  Many of 
these social enterprises direct their mission towards a specific group of stakeholder-beneficiaries (for 
example, promoting the interests of a local community, supporting an environmental cause, providing 
affordable housing, improving childcare facilities, furthering the cause of gender equality, and so on). 
They accept considerably more commercial restrictions in their constitutional structure than mission-
led businesses,28 avoid compromising the integrity of their mission, for example to prevent a 
commercial sale of company assets or the extraction of profits for shareholders.  
In principle, these features too may over time be reversed when company owners vote to change 
the structure of the firm.29 However, in the UK for example, legal formats such as the community 
interest company (CiC)30 are now available to impose a permanent asset lock on the business, a 
constitutional device that prevents the distribution of residual assets to members and ensures that the 
community benefit of any retained surplus, or residual value, cannot be appropriated for the private 
benefit of its members.31 In addition, CiCs that are set up as companies limited by shares are subject to 
a regulated dividend cap that is calculated chiefly as an aggregate limit on the total dividend declared. 
The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that profits continue to be principally invested for their 
stakeholder-beneficiaries, defined as their community benefit in the firm’s constitution. They are 
enacted and enforced by a statutory regime that companies adopt voluntarily but which, once adopted, 
they may not rescind. But these commercial restrictions make growing and maintaining an economically 
sustainable business challenging for most social enterprises,32 and there is a slight trend towards greater 
commercialisation of CiCs. Recent revisions to the CiC statutory framework loosened the original 
restrictions on dividends and performance-related loans to build in greater flexibility, leading to a slight 
upward trend in CiCs issuing shares to raise finance.33  
3. Co-ownership and cooperation 
 
A third and alternative trend in economic organising sees more forms of shared ownership incorporated 
into firms. The diversity of these forms is considerable. At one end of the spectrum, there exists in some 
jurisdictions a ‘significant and growing’ trend towards greater employee ownership in firms.34 
Commentators, academics and practitioners, increasingly challenge assumptions that employee-owned 
                                                          
28 Social Enterprise UK, State of Social Enterprise Survey 2015 (2015) 
<https://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/Pages/Category/state-of-social-enterprise-reports>; D. Gregory, ‘The 
Politics, Policy, Popular Perception and Practice of Social Enterprise in the 21st Century’ in Shaping the 
Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity, eds. N. Boeger and C. Villiers 
(forthcoming). 
29 S. Lloyd, ‘Transcript: Creating the CIC’ (2010) 35(1) Vermont Law Rev. 31.  
30 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK) and Community Interest Company 
Regulations 2005 (UK) (SI 2005/1788), as amended by the Community Interest Company (Amendment) 
Regulations 2009 (UK) (SI 2009/1942) and Community Interest Companies (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (UK) 
(SI 2014/2483). 
31 Office of the Regulatory of Community Interest Companies, Community Interest Companies Guidance 
Chapters (2013, updated 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/community-interest-companies-
how-to-form-a-cic>. 
32 Lloyd, op. cit., n. 29; Social Enterprise UK, op. cit., n. 28.  
33 N. Boeger et al., ‘Lessons from the Community Interest Company’ in Shaping the Corporate Landscape: 
Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity, eds. N. Boeger and C. Villiers (forthcoming). 
34 UK Employee Ownership Association, What Is Employee Ownership? (2017) 
<http://employeeownership.co.uk/what-is-employee-ownership/>; J.R. Blasi et al., The Citizen’s Share: 
Reducing Inequality in the 21st Century (2014). 
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firms would be ‘less efficient that the [capitalist] alternatives which grow up and survive in a 
competitive environment’.35 They contend instead that current trends point in the other direction, 
towards ‘empirical evidence showing these predictions to be entirely false’.36 Employee ownership 
itself, however, spans a considerable spectrum of options. It includes examples of democratically-
owned firms where ‘all of the workers who produce the surplus generated inside the enterprise function 
collectively to appropriate and distribute it’.37 But it also comprises models that limit the autonomy of 
employee-shareholders to shape decision-making within the firm because rights (for example, to 
appoint directors) can be unevenly distributed within the firm or easily reversible at the board’s 
discretion.38   
A further and related development is the resurgence in cooperative ownership of the firm. It is 
related to the previous, in that many employee-owned businesses are cooperatives,39 although not all 
coops are employee-owned. More generally, cooperative enterprises are co-owned by those who 
participate in the business (their members) – they may be employees, or consumers, residents, tenants, 
a group of artists, taxi drivers, farmers, and so forth. It is a central feature of cooperatives that they are 
democratically governed by their members, and these commitments are embedded in seven 
international cooperative principles, to which most coops subscribe. Although their members are 
traditionally the primary beneficiaries of cooperatives, they have also historically been more strongly 
orientated towards community values than investor-owned companies.40 The cooperative principles 
expressly integrate a principle on ‘concern for community’, and include a commitment to contribute to 
the sustainable development of the whole community. Many cooperative models therefore are also 
mission-led or social enterprises, and boundaries between these labels are further blurred as some 
‘social cooperative’ formats commit their enterprise explicitly to a specific social venture.41 The 
traditional social roots of the cooperative movement remain influential, though cooperatives have also 
developed a greater commercial presence, and a distinctly economic role in developing a ‘cooperative 
economy’.42 
4. Multi-stakeholder variants of co-ownership and cooperation 
 
A relatively recent phenomenon is the emergence, and more explicit design, of multi-stakeholder 
formats for co-ownership and cooperation in the firm, a movement that some have referred to as ‘new 
cooperativism’.43 The core idea of these initiatives is to impart ‘more emphasis on shared return and 
solidarity between stakeholders’ and rather less on ‘meeting the needs of a single stakeholder’.44 As 
Ridley-Duff points out, whereas ‘old cooperativism’ confined discussion of a common bond (solidarity) 
to the social characteristics of a single stakeholder group (for example, workers, consumers, producers), 
                                                          
35 M. Jensen and W. Meckling, ‘Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor Managed Firms and 
Codetermination’ (1979) 32 J. of Business 469, at 473.  
36 D. Erdal, ‘Recognising Facts in Economic Democracy in Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards 
Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity, eds. N. Boeger and C. Villiers (forthcoming); see also Blasi et al., 
op. cit., n. 34.  
37 R. Wolff, Democracy at Work: A Cure for Capitalism (2012), at 120.  
38 D. Erdal, Beyond the Corporation: Humanity Working (2011), at 20; Blasi et al., op. cit., n. 34., pp. 195-223. 
39 V. Pérotin, ‘What Do We Really Know About Worker Co-Operatives?’ Co-Operatives UK, 2016 
<http://www.uk.coop/sites/default/files/uploads/attachments/worker_co-op_report.pdf>. 
40 R. Ridley-Duff, The Case for FairShares: A New Model for Social Enterprise Development and the 
Strengthening of the Social and Solidarity Economy (2015) <http://shura.shu.ac.uk/10198/>. 
41 J. Defourny and M. Nyssens, ‘Social Cooperatives: When Social Enterprises Meet the Co-operative Tradition’ 
(2013) 2(2) J. of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity 11. 
42 E. Mayo (ed.), The Co-operative Advantage: Innovation, Co-Operation and Why Sharing Business Ownership 
Is Good for Britain (2015). 
43 Ridley-Duff, op. cit., n. 40; M. Vieta, ‘The New Cooperativism’ (2010) 4(1) Affinities: A J. of Radical 
Theory, Culture, and Action 1.  
44 Ridley-Duff, id., pp. 17-9.  
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new cooperativism assumes that, provided appropriate institutional arrangements are in place, solidarity 
can be forged between all these stakeholders.45 An example of this trend is a set of 'FairShares' model 
articles of association, devised by Ridley-Duff and others. These offer firms wishing to set up as a 
limited company, association or society a constitutional template for creating a multi-stakeholder (co-
owned and democratically governed) enterprise that issues different types of shares to founders, 
investors, users and workers, with democratically allocated voting rights (one person one vote).46 The 
central idea is to value different forms of investments in the firm, so that ‘just as a financial investor 
gets back both their original capital plus a dividend, so an intellectual (labour) investor gets back both 
their original capital plus any dividend to which they are entitled’.47 The model also commits member-
shareholders to sharing any property, including and especially intellectual property, that they generate 
through their joint enterprise.  
Others have described ideas related to new cooperativism as a movement whereby businesses 
are run by workers and communities. Wolff for example considers a democratic model of worker-self-
directed firms that involves workers running the firm, and appropriating (and distributing) their 
collectively generated wealth, ‘in conjunction – in a shared democratic decision-making process – with 
the surrounding communities at the local, regional and national levels’.48 Vieta, similarly, describes 
‘new’ cooperative enterprises as related to sustainable development and a wider social mission, more 
horizontal labour relations and more egalitarian distribution of surplus, as well as an orientation towards 
the community in which they operate.49 Cooperatives UK, the largest cooperative membership 
association in Britain, provides an even wider definition, describing cooperatives quite simply, and 
broadly, as ‘organisations that give people ownership and control over the things that matter to them’.50  
Located within the same trend but with a more directed focus is the movement towards platform 
cooperativism. It positions itself in opposition to capitalistically governed online platforms which, like 
Uber and Airbnb, describe themselves as part of a ‘sharing’ economy (on the basis that they facilitate 
resource ‘sharing’ or ‘pooling’) but are investor-owned and run as traditional corporations. The concern 
is that these are insufficiently transparent and democratic, yet increasingly powerful (see also Prabhat 
in this issue). Their technologies are, as Schor argues, ‘potentially powerful tools for building a social 
movement [centred] on genuine practices of sharing and cooperation in the production and consumption 
of goods and services’, but ‘achieving that potential will require democratizing the ownership and 
governance of the platforms’.51 Cooperatively owned platforms, on other hand, are structured as 
common resources and open to external members;52 enabling those who provide and use services 
mediated by internet platforms to own and control the platforms themselves.53  
                                                          
45 R. Ridley-Duff, ‘The Internationalisation of the FairShares Model: Where Agency Meets Structure in US and 
UK Company Law’ in N. Boeger and C. Villiers (eds.) Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Toward Corporate 
Reform and Enterprise Diversity (forthcoming); see also M. Lund, Solidarity as Business Model: A Multi-
Stakeholder Co-Operative’s Manual (2012). 
46 Ridley-Duff, op. cit., n. 40, p. 30.  
47 Ridley-Duff, id., pp. 37-8. 
48 Wolff, op. cit., n. 37, p. 120.  
49 Vieta, op. cit., n. 43. 
50 Cooperatives UK, The UK Cooperative Economy 2017 (2017) <http://reports.uk.coop/economy2017/ 
(accessed 28 July 2017)> 
51 J. Schor, ‘Debating the Sharing Economy’ (2014) Great Transition Initiative 
<http://www.tellus.org/pub/Schor_Debating_the_Sharing_Economy.pdf>, at 1.  
52 See the development of ‘open coops’:  J. Davies-Coates, ‘Open Co-ops: Inspiration, Legal Structure & Tools’ 
STIR Magazine, Spring 2014, <http://www.stirtoaction.com/article/open-co-ops>. 
53 B. Morgan, ‘A Thousand Flowers Blooming’ STIR Magazine, 11 January 2016, 
<http://www.stirtoaction.com/blog/a-thousand-flowers-blooming>. 
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5. Promise and complexity 
These are promising trends that suggest possibilities for alternative business forms exist and are further 
evolving. But they also offer a picture of deep complexity and confusion, not only because they all face 
practical challenges (for example, how to integrate their social mission and commercial sustainability; 
or how to balance democratic governance and purposeful management). In addition, their structural 
diversity, and spontaneous development, have brought a certain lack of cohesion, and uncertainty what 
their development might mean for the conventional corporate (legal) form.  
The growing relevance of ‘mission-led’ corporate businesses for example suggests that the 
conventional form is far from finished as an instrument for socially responsible economic organisation. 
It suggests that by creatively engaging with the format and structuring firms around a mission or 
purpose, socially-minded entrepreneurs will be able to continue to do ‘do well by doing good’ and 
develop, perhaps, a more responsible form of capitalism. Others however are not so confident and 
concerned that (some) corporations may turn to the mission-led business label as a ‘brand’ rather than 
instigating fundamental changes to the corporate culture of their business.54 Especially the 
enforceability of commitments towards wider stakeholders remains a matter of contestation because so 
far, the only members entitled to legally enforce their rights vis-à-vis the firm under this model, usually 
remain the shareholders. The B Corp certification process for example currently requires a modification 
of companies’ constitutional documents to include stakeholders (i.e. interest groups beyond 
shareholders) in their objectives, but without guaranteeing these stakeholders any form of redress or 
cause of action.55 
The emergence of more radical alternatives - multi-stakeholder cooperative firms or social 
enterprises, with ownership and governance structures fundamentally different to the traditional 
shareholder cooperation - on the other hand implies that the need, and appetite, for reforming the 
existing corporate landscape goes deeper. It suggests that ‘post-capitalist’ alternative models of the firm 
may in fact be necessary to address shortcomings of mainstream corporations today, both on- and 
offline.56 On the other hand, to operate and survive on the market, these alternative forms must often 
emulate corporate market actors in ways that ensure their business grows and remains competitive.57 
Balancing financial sustainability and growth (often tied to questions around access to suitable 
investment markets) on the one hand, and a commitment to the wider concerns of their (multiple) 
stakeholders on the other hand, is complex and requires robust business governance including the 
appropriate measures of accounting and means of conflict resolution.58 It particularly relies on corporate 
and cooperative legal forms to be sufficiently sophisticated and flexible to accommodate such 
complexity.59  
These are questions, and challenges, these alternative business forms are and will be facing 
daily. And again, these concerns might also force us to reconsider how such business models will 
guarantee that their accountability towards their stakeholders is impactful, including effective 
mechanisms for enforcement. Social impact reporting and accounting provides one tool to improve both 
transparency and accountability, but only if it requires the business to report the full impact of its 
activities rather than focus on financial results. Further, to guarantee genuine accountability, Cooper 
argues, ‘it is not sufficient for accountors to provide transparent and good information quality 
information to accountees.’ In addition, stakeholders must be able to ‘enter into a discussion with the 
corporation’s management and other stakeholders’ and, most importantly, through these discussions 
                                                          
54 Hunter and Boeger, op. cit., n. 23. 
55 Hunter and Boeger, id.; Hunter, op. cit., n. 6.  
56 Vieta, op. cit., n. 43.  
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they must be given the power to ‘influence decisions’.60 Without power to change corporate behaviour, 
accountability (as well as transparency), remains an empty promise. 
DEVELOPING THE FIRM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MARKET CONTESTATION 
 
In sum, what we see in these wider developments is promise, diversity and complexity. As we might 
expect, these have more or less grown in tandem, but so has the question whether, notwithstanding their 
considerable structural differences, there is in fact a deeper pattern to these various initiatives of 
alternative organising. To consider this, we might have to go back a step or two. This article initially 
argued that the traditional structure of the corporation – the shareholder primacy model of corporate 
governance – and its political dominance are significant contributing factors to the current crisis of 
capitalism: to speak in Polanyian terms, it has un-balanced the movement vs. counter-movement 
dialectic necessary to keep the operation of capitalistically ordered markets sufficiently in check; to 
ensure they remain socially embedded and thus sustainable. In our search for ways out if this bind – to 
break the cycle of corporate influence – we might choose on the one hand to engage our public 
autonomy as citizens to focus on possibilities for strengthening our democratic political processes and 
improving regulatory procedures (within the nation or at transnational level), to ensure that genuine 
contestation of the market and its limits can be effective; that society can (re-)assume control where 
necessary to address and avoid socially destructive effects of unregulated markets (a process explored 
constructively, for example, in Thorpe's discussion of civic contribution to regulations, in this issue).   
But the existence, and emergence, of these alternative enterprise forms suggests a 
complementary pathway for responding to corporate dominance and the ensuing impact on market 
contestation. This response relies on individual market actors (entrepreneurs, company directors, 
workers, communities and so on) using their private autonomy - their freedom to participate in the 
market and be active in the economy - to structure firms in ways that enable market contestation as well 
as market activity. These are not regulatory or public, but rather ‘transactional’ or private choices,61 
where the structure of the firm is being instrumentalised, however imperfectly, to internalise a process 
of democratic contestation: a procedure to mediate the interests of various stakeholders (including, 
where they exist, shareholders); thus determining how far pure market logic and purely economic 
incentives are pursued, and conversely what limitations are placed on that logic, based on  
Leaving aside their practical complexities and structural differences, the structures of all these 
alternative business forms are somewhere on a trajectory towards stakeholder governance. They point 
(however partially and imperfectly they might execute it) towards a model of corporate governance that 
commits the firm to generating value by maximising the positive impact on its (internal and external) 
stakeholders while limiting negative impacts, with trade-offs to be carefully balanced against each 
other. Conceptually, this is a step change. It follows a more direct democratic model for checking the 
market, in the sense that it socialises the market continuously at a micro (firm) level, while a 
representative democratic model does so by relying on regulatory intervention and the macro (political) 
level. This micro-checking realises the ‘embedded firm’ – the idea that external (political, social, 
regulatory) pressures on firms shape their governance practices – but by obliging firms to internalise 
those pressures through their very structure.62 The firm, its constitution and its governance model, is 
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instrumentalised to ensure that the socially destructive force of (unregulated) markets, and the economic 
interests of individual market actors, are kept in check. 
The practical implementation of this model requires more than just responding to market signals 
at the call of a corporate board and its CSR policy. Instead, procedural measures are built into the 
constitution of the firm to ensure it is committed to account for the impact of its activities on its wider 
stakeholders, as well as assess trade-offs between them. When such measures are incorporated, holding 
firms to their commitment towards stakeholders, they render them categorically different from 
conventional corporations, even those with comprehensive CSR policies. However partially or 
imperfectly it might be implemented in practice (there is, as we have seen above, no shortage of 
challenges and complexities), these procedures point towards an emergent stakeholder model of 
corporate governance that is structurally the reverse of the shareholder primacy model. In the case of 
mission-led business and social enterprise, these procedures comprise stakeholder engagement by 
management, adequate reporting procedures and adjustments to the firm’s constitutional objects clauses 
and, if required, an asset-lock and restrictions relating to profit distribution. Co-ownership and 
cooperative models on the other hand will primarily include mechanisms for sharing property and 
democratic governance (voting) in the firm. In practice, a mixture of different procedural mechanisms 
is available and may feature in various alternative business forms.   
CONCLUSION 
 
In considering the crisis of capitalism, and the related critique of corporations and their governance, 
this article has struck a note of cautious optimism. It has highlighted that there exists today a great 
diversity of formats that enable business enterprises to address concerns beyond maximising profit for 
shareholders. In fact, such is their diversity that it calls into question any purist claim, that ‘doing good’ 
is something that will be left to non-profits while the (only) purpose of business is to ‘do well’ for its 
owners or investors.63 So many and so varied are their forms that one of the key challenges today is 
defining common ground and a common language to develop cross-cutting ideas and concepts that may 
come to define new, or refine existing, legal and governance structures.64 Many other questions persist, 
from the complexity of organising commercially viable social or mission-led enterprises,65 to designing 
multi-stakeholder enterprises that are truly accountable to stakeholders;66 towards again wider questions 
of what are legitimate ‘ends’ and ‘means’, of business.67 It is apparent too that given their complexity, 
the development of successful alternative business forms will depend heavily on the capacity of the 
political process, and the wider regulatory environment, to facilitate and nurture viable alternatives, 
even if to do so goes against the grain of corporate economic and political dominance today.68 In this, 
regulatory reform has a central role to play, whether it is by developing new legal formats for businesses, 
or by addressing wider relevant issues for their development (tax incentives, social investment, planning 
and property laws to ensure adequate access to land, and so on).69 
This article has argued that there is promise in these alternatives especially because the 
underpinning pattern points towards a stakeholder model of corporate governance which differs 
categorically from the dominant shareholder primacy model. Broadly speaking, it commits the firm to 
generating value by maximising the positive impact on its internal and external stakeholders while 
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limiting negative impacts, with trade-offs to be carefully balanced against each other. Through these 
commitments, the firm internalises a process of democratic contestation: a procedure to mediate the 
different interests of these market actors is incorporated directly into the structure of the firm, through 
procedural mechanisms embedded within its internal constitution. However imperfectly or partially any 
of the existing and emerging alternative forms implement this model, their trajectory points towards 
stakeholder governance. The more they succeed as viable alternatives to the conventional corporate 
form, the more they can put the latter’s failures into relief, inviting questions about its dominance as the 
standard business form. This might yet lead us to a point where we may begin to have a genuine political 
discussion about advantages of various business forms, including the corporation as ‘only one form of 
organising amongst many, many others’.70 
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